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Abstract
We investigate the mechanisms that shape the gender wage gap in Portugal and
provide a clear measure of the impact of the allocation of workers to rms and
to jobs. We nd that one fth of the gender gap results from segregation of
workers across rms and another fth from job segregation. We also conclude
that the \glass ceiling eect" operates mainly through worker allocation to
rms rather than occupations. Our results are based on the application of
Gelbach's decomposition method to the conditional wage gap obtained from a
wage equation with high-dimensional xed eects. This approach may prove to
be equally useful in applications to other problems in economics.
JEL Classications: J31, J16, J24, J71.
1 Introduction
It is well established that rms play a key role shaping wage dierences across
gender. Indeed, most models of labour market discrimination { whether based
on the tastes of employers, co-workers, or consumers, on employers' judgment
of statistical evidence (Becker, 1957), or on unconscious mental associations
(Bertrand et al., 2010) { grant the rm the crucial decision making power.
Moreover, rms are heterogeneous along several observable and unobservable
dimensions other than the potential distaste for a particular group of workers.
Therefore, in a market where there are good and bad rms or simply rms with
dierent wage policies, segregation of workers across rms is likely to lead to
a wage gap that will persist over time [see the earlier work of Blau (1977) and
Groshen (1991) on this topic]. Carrington and Troske (1998), Bertrand and
Hallock (2001), Bayard et al. (2003), Meng and Meurs (2004), and Woodcock
(2008) provided evidence on the relevance of worker allocation to rms as a
determinant of gender wage dierentials. However, all these studies were based
on data sets with important limitations. They either covered a restricted set
of rms, occupations, or cities or, when covering broader populations, lacked
a reliable method to match workers and rms. Still other studies used sam-
ples of workers, thus precluding the proper measurement of gender segregation
across units. Alongside this evidence, there is work documenting discriminatory
practices in rms' hiring processes that lead to gender segregation across rms
(Goldin and Rouse, 2000).
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A second important dimension of wage formation is job title heterogeneity,
which may inuence wage rates for a variety of reasons. First, it is well known
that tasks that involve risks of fatal or otherwise serious accidents are better
paid than safe tasks. Thus, for example, one should expect signicant compen-
sating dierentials attached to occupations such as bullghters (included in our
sample). Second, jobs that need to be executed under dicult or stressful con-
ditions are also expected to be more highly remunerated than jobs performed
in pleasant environments. For example, one should observe higher wages for
individuals working on oshore oil platforms or in mines. Third, the complex-
ity of some tasks may require heavy doses of specic training and/or unusually
skilled workers. This would be a reason why, for example, brain surgeons and
prima ballerinas earn higher wages. Fourth, some occupations are known to
be chronically \overcrowded" whereas others are thought to be in excess de-
mand. Finally, the kind of technology in use may also foster unionisation of the
workplace and favour rent seeking. Production activities that imply the concen-
tration of a large number of workers in a single plant (say, in auto or shipbuilding
industries) facilitate industrial action, and thus improved wage conditions. To
properly incorporate these and other such wage determinants one needs a very
detailed accounting of the kind of jobs being undertaken by workers.
Empirical analysis of the role of occupational allocation has called attention
to the \glass ceiling" eect |a rising gender pay gap as we move up the wage
distribution. This eect reects the diculty faced by women in accessing the
higher ranks of the occupational ladder. It can be the result of discriminatory
promotion practices (Ransom and Oaxaca, 2005), women's lower reliance on
informal networks to seek promotions (Cannings and Montmarquette, 1991),
the fact that women receive fewer outside job oers (Blackaby et al., 2005),
or males' distaste for having a female boss (Baldwin et al., 2001). Consistent
with this evidence, Fortin and Huberman (2002) report on the decline in oc-
cupational segregation throughout the 20th century, paralleled by persistent
segregation within occupations along hierarchical lines. Bertrand and Hallock
(2001) found that dierential access to the very top occupations could account
for approximately half of the large gender pay gap among top corporate jobs in
the US. In general, occupational allocation has been shown to be an important
determinant of wage dierences across gender (Groshen, 1991; Kunze, 2005;
Amuedo-Dorantes and la Rica, 2006). As an exception, Manning and Swaeld
(2008) found little role for the occupation explaining the build-up of the gender
pay gap in the UK, from entry into the labour market, when hardly any gap
exists, until 10 years later.
The strand of literature on the role of occupations has also suered from
severe limitations. First of all, it has most often relied on a rather aggregate
denition of occupations. This is a major drawback when we seek to ensure that
we are comparing men and women who perform the same actual tasks inside the
rm. In this regard, the criticism by Altonji and Blank is particularly incisive:
\Since occupational categories and occupational characteristics are often crudely
measured, this raises the issue of whether important unobserved dierences in
the types of jobs women and men perform remain. This issue is hard to resolve
without rm-level data." (Altonji and Blank, 1999, p. 3221). Another line of
analysis uses data representative of the whole economy, but reporting only a
sample of workers within each rm. Given that there is no stratication of the
sample by gender, measures of gender segregation across rms are bound to
be awed |let alone segregation across jobs within the rm|as acknowledged
by Amuedo-Dorantes and la Rica (2006) or Bayard et al. (2003). Finally, to
overcome the serious measurement error that may result from using sample
data and the share of women in a unit as the measure of gender segregation,
dierent authors have used as regressors a set of dummy variables for the job
inside the rm. One particular problem here is that dummies for job inside
the rm absorb rm and occupation and we are left without the possibility of
quantifying the separate impact of gender segregation across rms and jobs.
More generally, the meta-analysis of the gender wage gap by Weichselbaumer
and Winter-Ebmer (2005) has shown that contrasts in results seem to be driven
mostly by the scope of the data analysed { whether a narrow set of rms and
occupations or a representative sample of the labour force.
Fortunately, we have access to an unusually rich data set that enables us
to identify the collective agreement that regulates the employment contract
applicable to each worker and, within each collective agreement, the detailed
occupational category of each worker. The reason why this information is col-
lected reects the specicities of the Portuguese wage setting system (largely
conformable to continental European practice). Each year, around 300 dier-
ent collective agreements are negotiated. The collective agreement denes wage
oors for each particular job title (so-called professional category or categoria
prossional). The main reason why this survey was created was, indeed, to allow
the ocials from the Ministry of Employment to verify whether the employers
were complying with the wage oors established by the collective agreement for
the job-title of the worker.
We are condent that by incorporating job title xed eects in the wage
regression, as well as employer xed eects, we can make good progress pro-
viding rened estimates of the gender pay gap ltered from the eects of job
title heterogeneity and rm heterogeneity. Indeed, this remarkable longitudi-
nal matched employer-employee data set covers the whole manufacturing and
service non-public sector in Portugal, with information on the rm, each of its
workers, and their detailed job. The longitudinal character of our data allows
us control for these dimensions using sets of high-dimensional xed eects.
Another strength of our work is its methodological contribution. Our ap-
proach combines the estimation of a model with three high-dimensional xed
eects (Guimar~aes and Portugal, 2010) with Gelbach's (2016) decomposition,
yielding an unambiguous allocation of the gender pay gap into its worker, rm,
and job-title components. This approach may prove equally useful in other
settings involving estimation of models with high-dimensional xed eects.
Section 2 presents indicators of female labour force integration in Portugal.
Section 3 describes the data, while methods are discussed in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 provides the key results on the determinants of the gender pay gap and
comments on the trends. Section 6 comments on our method as opposed to the
traditional methodology used to search for the sources of the gender wage gap.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Female labour force participation in Portugal
The pattern of female labour force participation over the life-cycle in Portugal
is remarkably similar to that of males, unlike what prevails in several other
countries, especially Southern European. In particular, around childbirth and
during the child rearing years, women in Portugal do not show a decline in
their labour force participation (Figure 1). Also, the degree of labour force
commitment, evaluated as hours of work is rather similar across gender (Figure
2), with a low incidence of part-time for either gender. Moreover, the observ-
able attributes of males and females in the labour market are similar or favour
women, namely in the case of education (see Figure 3, which reports a better
educational endowment for young and prime-age women than men).
Therefore, three factors documented as candidate explanations for the gen-
der pay gap, namely dierent education/training, career interruptions, and
shorter hours of work (see in particular the detailed study by Bertrand et al.
(2010) on MBA graduates) lose strength as sources of the gender pay gap in
an economy-wide setting like Portugal. Also, the fact that female participa-
tion patterns are so similar to males' over the lifecycle downplays the potential
impact of selection into the labour force on the gender pay gap.1
3 Data: The Quadros de Pessoal Survey
The data set employed in this study is quite unusual. The Quadros de Pessoal
(QP) is, by construction, a longitudinal matched employer-employee-job title
data set. QP is an annual mandatory employment survey collected by the Por-
tuguese Ministry of Employment that covers all establishments with at least
one wage earner. Due to the mandatory nature of the survey, problems com-
monly associated with panel data sets, such as panel attrition, are considerably
attenuated.
Data are available on each establishment (location, economic activity, and
employment), the rm with which it is aliated (location, economic activity,
employment, sales, and legal framework), and each and every one of its workers
(gender, age, education, skill, occupation, tenure, and earnings). The informa-
tion on earnings is very detailed, precise, and complete. It includes the base
wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), regular benets, and overtime pay.
Information on standard and overtime hours of work is also available. Because
the information on earnings is reported by the employer, it is likely to be subject
to less measurement error than worker-provided earnings data. The fact that
1Subject to the short-term maternity leave established by the law, currently set at four
months.
the information contained in the QP survey needs, by law, to be available in a
public space at the establishment further reinforces our trust in the information.
A notable feature of the QP is that it collects information regarding the
collective agreement that rules the wage dimension of the match between the
employer and the employee. Furthermore, within each collective agreement,
it identies the particular job-title that the worker holds. The relevance of
progressing from the broad classication of occupations traditionally available
in datasets into a richer description of the actual tasks performed by workers
has been highlighted in the literature [see for example Autor (2013), or Autor
et al. (2006), Goos and Manning (2007), and Dustmann et al. (2009) on job
polarisation]. This recent literature illustrates that, in addition to rm and
worker heterogeneity, wage outcomes are shaped by task heterogeneity, which
should be explicitly accounted for in the analysis (Torres et al., 2013). The
variable job category available in our dataset is well suited for an insightful
analysis of wage setting mechanisms | this classication of jobs goes beyond
a very ne partition of occupations, to consider the complexity of the task
performed, the skill level required for the job, the necessary labour market
experience, and the hierarchal standing of the worker. Moreover, it is the unit of
wage setting in collective bargaining dened within each collective agreement.
These job titles are rather disaggregated. For example, in the ship building
industry, the painter of the port side of the boat has a distinct job title from a
painter of the starboard (because those positions face dierent risks of accident).
Furthermore, similar occupations will be considered distinct job titles if their
wages are settled by dierent collective agreements. For example, a secretary
in the banking industry has a job title that is distinct from a secretary in the
textile industry. This level of disaggregation implies that, in a typical year,
the 300 collective agreements that are settled, determine about 30,000 wage
oors corresponding to 30,000 job titles [see Carneiro et al. (2014) and Martins
(2014)]. Furthermore, the coverage of the collective agreement reects as well
the degree of relative bargaining power of workers and employers.2 Our analysis
of the determinants of the gender pay gap will explicitly account for rm, worker
and job title heterogeneity.
The data set is longitudinal in nature. Each rm/establishment entering the
database is assigned a unique identifying number and the Ministry implements
several checks to ensure that a unit that has previously reported to the database
is not assigned a dierent identication number. Similarly, the data set provides
codes for each collective agreement and, within each collective agreement, for
the job-title of the worker. Workers also have a unique identication number
that is obtained from their social security number. This allows us to follow them
over the years and to match workers with their rms, the collective agreement
and the corresponding job-title that they hold in each year.
A number of restrictions were imposed on the raw data set. First, we limited
our analysis to full-time workers in mainland Portugal, between 1986 and 2008.
2For a detailed description of the Portuguese wage setting system see Cardoso and Portugal
(2005) and Addison et al. (2015)
Second, we excluded workers from the Agriculture and Fishery sectors. Third,
individuals younger than 18 years old and older than 65 years were also excised.
Fourth, we dropped from the analysis workers whose monthly wages were below
80% of the mandatory minimum wage, which corresponds to the lowest admis-
sible wage for apprentices. Finally, we dropped (around 1% of the total number
of) observations that did not belong to the largest connected group (see below).
Our nal sample included 28,212,770 observations.
The dependent variable used in our estimating equation is a measure of real
hourly labour earnings and is constructed as the ratio of the sum of deated
base wages, regular benets (including seniority payments), and overtime pay
over the sum of normal hours of work and overtime hours.
Table A1 in appendix reports descriptive statistics. On one hand, women
are slightly younger and have slightly lower tenure than men. On the other
hand, they tend to be more educated. The \raw" gender pay gap during the
period under analysis was 24 log points.
4 Firm, job, and worker eects in wage regres-
sions
In this section we discuss methodological aspects related to the estimation of the
model and the decomposition approach of Gelbach (2016). The methodology
applied in our paper expands that initially developed by Abowd et al. (1999),
who presented a statistical framework permitting worker and rm xed eects
to be estimated simultaneously in wage regressions. However, as noted earlier,
and as elaborated upon below, we include a third xed eect for the job title and
use a dierent algorithm to obtain an exact solution for the estimation problem.
The linear wage equation to be estimated has the form:
lnwifjt = xift + i + f + j + "ifjt ; (1)
which is related, in the statistical literature, with the \three-factor analysis of
covariance." In this equation, lnwifjt is the natural logarithm of the real hourly
wage of individual i (i = 1; :::; N) working at rm f (f = 1; :::; F ) and holding
a job title j (j = 1; :::; J) at year t (t = 1; :::; Ti). There are Ti observations for
each individual i and a total of N observations. xift is a row-vector of observed
(measured) time-varying characteristics of individual i (a quadratic term on age
and a quadratic term on tenure) as well as time dummies that capture growth
in real wages. i is the person or worker xed eect (capturing observed and
unobserved individual time-invariant heterogeneity), f is the rm xed eect
(capturing observed and unobserved rm time-invariant heterogeneity), and j
is the job title xed eect (capturing observed and unobserved job title time-
invariant heterogeneity). According to this equation, there are ve components
that explain the wage variability:
1. the time-varying characteristics (xift);
2. the workers' permanent heterogeneity or worker xed eects (i);
3. the rms' permanent heterogeneity or rm xed eects (f );
4. the job titles' permanent heterogeneity or job title xed eects (j); and,
5. an error term component ("ifjt), assumed to follow the conventional as-
sumptions.
In matrix notation, the stacked system has the form:
Y = X +D + F+ L+ " : (2)
In this equationY is a (N1) vector of real hourly wage (in logs), X is a (N
k) matrix containing the observed time-varying characteristics of individuals
and time dummies, D is a (N N) design matrix for the worker eects, F is
a (N  F ) design matrix for the rm eects, L is a (N  J) design matrix
for the job title eects,  is a (N  1) vector of worker eects,  is a (F  1)
vector of rm eects,  is a (J1) vector of job title eects, and " is a (N1)
vector of disturbances (we assume that conditional on X, D, F, and L, mobility
is exogenous, in order to make the design matrices orthogonal to the vector of
disturbances).
Equations (1) and (2) can be interpreted as the conditional expectation of
(log) real hourly wages given the observable characteristics of workers, the date
of observation, and the identity of individuals, employing rms, and job titles.
The total number of parameters to be estimated is therefore k + N + J + F .
However, it will not be possible to identify all worker, rm, and job title xed
eects, and a number of G restrictions will have to be imposed allowing us to
estimate only k +N + J + F  G parameters.
Abowd et al. (2002) show that in a model with two high-dimensional xed
eects (rm and worker xed eects) the number of restrictions that need to be
imposed equals the number of \mobility groups," that is, the number of groups
of connected rms and individuals. Moreover, estimates of the xed eects are
comparable only within the same \mobility group".
With three xed eects the situation is more complex. While it may be
possible to identify the number of restrictions that need to be imposed on the
parameters, there is no clear parallel to the \mobility groups" found in the con-
text of the model with two xed eects. However, using an algorithm proposed
by Weeks and Williams (1964), one can identify a subset of the data in which
all xed eects are connected. This means that if we restrict analysis to this
subset of the data, we are assured that the estimates of the xed eects are
comparable and, in this case, the number of restrictions, G, equals 2 (this group
accounts for 99% of our original data set).
The full least squares solution to estimate the parameters in (1) solves the
following set of normal equations:2664
X0X X0D X0F X0L
D0X D0D D0F D0L
F0X F0D F0F F0L
L0X L0D L0F L0L
3775
2664




3775 =
2664
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D0Y
F0Y
L0Y
3775
However, the high-dimensionality of D, F, and L prevents the application of
the conventional least squares formula. To estimate all parameters (worker,
rm and job title xed eects, and the coecients of all observed time-varying
worker and time dummies) would require the inversion of a huge matrix. This
is impossible to achieve using standard software routines and present-day com-
puters. Accordingly, alternative approaches are required to estimate the full
model parameters.
Abowd et al. (1999) proposed an approximate statistical solution that cor-
responds to using conditional estimation methods that provide estimators that
are as similar as possible to full least squares, but computationally tractable. In
a subsequent paper, Abowd et al. (2002) developed an algorithm that permits
an exact solution of the least squares estimation of equations such as (1), for
the case with two high-dimensional xed eects. In the present treatment, we
followed an alternative methodology that provides the exact solution for the
linear regression with three high-dimensional xed eects. This procedure was
developed by Guimar~aes and Portugal (2010) for the estimation of linear re-
gression models with two or more high-dimensional xed eects. In brief, this
methodology is based on a partitioned algorithm strategy and follows an iter-
ative procedure that leads to the exact solution of the least squares problem.
While computationally intensive given its iterative nature, the approach imposes
minimum memory requirements. For a detailed description of this methodology
and how it can be implemented to estimate equation (1) see Guimar~aes and
Portugal (2010).
We then apply Gelbach's exact decomposition, which is based on the for-
mula for omitted variable bias. This decomposition allows for an unequivocal
quantication of the portion of the gender pay gap due to each of the variables
of interest. More specically, suppose that we run a simpler model that includes
the X covariates plus G, a gender dummy variable. Our aim is to understand
what happens to the coecient on the gender dummy when we go from this
basic specication
Y = Xe + G+ " (3)
to the full specication in (2) where all three xed eects are added. Even
though the gender variable is absorbed by the worker xed eect we are still
able to identify the contribution of each xed eect to the gender gap. To gain
some intuition into the workings of Gelbach's decomposition in this particular
setting assume for the moment that the only covariate included in the base
specication is G.3 Now, the estimated coecient of the regression of Y on G,
say bG, is the dierence between the average wage (in logs) of females and males
(the \raw" gender gap). In matrix terms, the coecient bG can be expressed as
bG = (G0G) 1G0Y (4)
where G M1G and M1  [I  1(101) 110 ] is a matrix that demeans a pre-
multiplied vector and 1 is a conformable vector of ones. When applied to any
3We thank Jonah Gelbach for suggesting this way of presenting the decomposition.
vector the matrix (G
0
G) 1G
0
calculates the dierence between the averages
of males and females. Consider now the tted regression model that includes
only the three xed eects,
Y = Db + Fb+ Lb+ b" (5)
and note that in the above expression Db, Fb, and Lb are column vectors
containing the least-square estimates of the xed eects for the worker, rm,
and job titles, respectively. Pre-multiplying all terms of the above equation by
(G
0
G) 1G
0
we obtain
bG = bG + bG + bG ; (6)
where we note that (G
0
G) 1G
0
is orthogonal to b". The above expression
shows that the \raw" gender gap can be partitioned into three components each
associated with a xed eect. These components are simply the dierence be-
tween the average estimated xed eects for males and females. If, for example,
the average of the xed eects associated with job-titles is identical for males
and females then the allocation into jobs has no contribution to the gender gap.
While intuitive, this decomposition ignores time-varying eects that may ex-
plain part of the gender gap. Thus, as stated earlier, our interest centers on
understanding what happens when we move from the standard equation (3) to
the full specication in (2) that includes all three xed eects. In this latter case
the procedure is the same the only dierence being the need to partial out the ef-
fect of the time-varying covariates. In practical terms this means that we replace
M1 by M2  [I  X(X0X) 1X0 ] on the derivation above. The decomposition
shown in (6) remains valid but now it yields an unambiguous decomposition of
the covariate adjusted (i.e. conditional) wage gap. The interpretation of the
coecients in (6) remains clear. For example, the coecient bG represents the
log point reduction in the gender pay gap that would occur if males and females
were equally paid across rms, conditional on all other variables included in the
full model. The two other coecients may be interpreted in a similar fashion.
5 The sources of the gender pay gap
The \raw" gender pay gap in Portugal throughout the period under analysis
was 24 log points. The adjusted gender gap, conditional on the workers' age,
to proxy for labour market experience, and tenure, reduces to 23 log points,
reecting women's very slight disadvantage in those observable attributes (col-
umn 1 in Table A2 in the appendix reports the regression results on this basic
specication given by equation 3). This average gap conceals an impressive con-
trast across the male and female wage distributions (see Figure 4). The female
wage distribution is considerably more concentrated around a lower wage level
|see the much higher peak and its shift to the left.
A relevant question that follows is therefore: How are males and females
allocated in the labour market so as to generate this outcome? How far can the
access to dierent rms and to very detailed jobs go in explaining the contrast
across wage distributions? Figure 5 reports the estimates from our model of
the high-dimensional xed eects for the rm, the job, and the worker obtained
from estimation of equation (1). A novel view on the gender pay gap is obtained
showing exactly where in the distribution of rm and job quality the pay gap is
determined. Females are not only employed in rms and jobs of lower average
quality than males, but they are considerably more concentrated in such units,
as indicated by the more peaked distributions and their shift to the left with
respect to males' distribution. The concentration of female employment in lower
paying units is particularly striking for jobs.
The following questions arise as a result: How much exactly does the alloca-
tion into rms and jobs matter for the gender pay gap? What is left of the gap
once we account for those allocation mechanisms? Following our estimation of
the sets of high-dimension xed eects reported in Figure 5, we use Gelbach's
(2016) methodology to provide an unambiguous answer to these questions. Ta-
ble 1 reports the results of the decomposition. In the rst row of Table 1 we
follow equation (6) and implement the decomposition using as a reference the
full model that includes rm, job, and worker xed eects.4 We can see that the
allocation of males and females to rms of dierent quality accounts for 4.3 log
points of the gender pay gap (or 19% of the conditional gap). Interestingly, the
allocation to jobs accounts for almost the same share of the total conditional
gender wage gap as that due to rms. The remaining 63% of the gender gap
persists within jobs and rms for workers of the same age and rm seniority (an
issue to which we will return in the next section).
The empirical distribution of the rm xed-eects evinces the fundamental
importance of heterogeneity of wage policies across rms. In Portugal, per-
manent rm heterogeneity accounts for more than one third of the total wage
variation (Torres et al., 2013). This means that prospective employees facing
a highly dispersed distribution of wage oers may benet greatly if they inten-
sively invest in job search to locate the rms with more generous wage policies.
It is clear from Figure 5 and Table 1 that male workers are more successful than
female workers at being hired and retaining jobs in high-wage rms.
Why are women penalised by the allocation across rms? One possibility
would be that female workers are less ecient job searchers. A number of mech-
anisms may lie behind this. First, women may search less intensively than men
because they may have more productive alternatives for the allocation of their
time (e.g., domestic production). Second, women may limit the set of job oppor-
tunities to jobs with particular characteristics (e.g., exibility of work schedules).
Third, women may shape their search strategy to the labour supply decisions
of their husbands, as implied by rst generation labour supply models. For ex-
ample, those women may severely restrict the geographical boundaries of their
job search. Fourth, women may have signicant disadvantages compared with
men, exploiting their social networks to locate suitable job oers. Furthermore,
4It is well known that in short panels the xed eects estimates are inconsistent. However,
as suggested to us by Jonah Gelbach, these decompositions are functionals of the full set of
estimated xed eects and thus they should satisfy large sample properties.
there is some evidence that female dominated social networks tend to favour
the placement of women in female dominated jobs and occupations (Mencken
and Wineld, 2000). Fifth, women may underestimate the relevant distribution
of wage oers, either because they expect to be discriminated against by some
rms or because they misrepresent their true value to the rm and bargain wages
less aggressively than men (Card et al., 2015). A telling indication that women
have lower expectations regarding wages is given by evidence that they report
lower reservation wages than men for similar observed characteristics (Addison
et al., 2004).
From the employer perspective it appears that high-wage rms hire (or re-
tain) female workers less frequently than male workers. Conventional expla-
nations based on the preferences of employers, customers, or co-workers may
be raised. Alternatively, expectations of career interruptions by female work-
ers may partially justify this asymmetry in hiring decisions. Nevertheless, it
is not clear why such explanations should apply more intensively to rms that
practice more generous wage policies. Indeed, not only are women sorted more
frequently into low-wage rms, but also the wage penalty increases with the
size of the rm xed eect: the gender gap increases from -0.3% at the 10th
percentile, to -4.9% at the median, to -11.4% at the 90th percentile (Table A3
in appendix). From this evidence it is quite clear that the glass ceiling applies
much more to rms than to occupations or job-titles (but see below).
Job-title heterogeneity also plays a considerable role in wage variation. The
notion of job-title summarises the skill requirements and the hierarchical posi-
tion held by the worker. Job-title segregation is simply a more accurate, rened,
and disaggregated version of the so-called occupational segregation. Because the
denition of the job-title is an outcome of the negotiation between trade unions
and employer associations, it also reects the bargaining power of the workers.
The evidence provided in Figure 5 and Table 1 shows that female workers suer
a signicant wage penalty associated with the process of sorting into dierent
job-titles. Why are women allocated to lower-paying job-titles? What is be-
hind job-title segregation? The presence of barriers to entry into high-paying
job-titles, driven either by the hiring decisions of the employers or by the require-
ments of the job, is certainly one of the mechanisms at work. Job promotion
decisions biased against female workers may also be at play. Overcrowding
of job-titles highly preferred by female workers may drive their corresponding
wages down. On the other hand, the access to some high-wage job-titles that
are controlled by closed shop trade unions are frequently male-dominated (e.g.
longshoremen). The allocation into job-titles is responsible for around one fth
of the total gender gap.
There is, however, no indication that the wage gap between men and women
increases signicantly along the job-title xed eect dimension. When we com-
pare the distribution of job-title xed-eects among males and females, we ob-
tain a -1.9% dierence for the 10th percentile, -3.9% at the median, and just
-2.4% for the 90th percentile. As hinted at above, there is no indication of a
glass ceiling along the job-title dimension, once we take into account the hetero-
geneity of the rm's wage policies. This nding is consistent with recent work
by Manning and Swaeld (2008), who concluded that occupational allocation
in the UK has little role in explaining the widening of the gender pay gap during
the rst ten years after entry into the labour market.
The period under analysis comprises two decades and we are interested in
checking for any possible changes in the sources of the gender pay gap. We
have therefore performed a decomposition of the gap on a year by year basis.
In Figure 6, we see that the overall gender pay gap |sum of the three compo-
nents |widened during the rst decade and narrowed during the subsequent
decade. Over the whole period the shrinking of the gap was due mostly to the
convergence in the worker xed eect component, from a gender gap of -13.8 log
points in 1986 to -11.8 log points by 2008. In the meantime, the importance of
segregation across rms also fell, though only slightly, from a gap of -4.7 to -3.3
log points. The reverse was observed for segregation across jobs, reected in a
contribution to the overall conditional gap that increased from -3.2 to -4.6 log
points. We therefore nd a decline over time in the \discrimination" component
of the gender gap and a slightly more equal access to rm types; nevertheless,
access to job types would, by itself, have contributed to widening the gender
pay gap.
6 Our proposal and earlier methods
The most commonly used procedure to investigate the sources of the gender
pay gap has been the familiar Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition into dierences in
labour market attributes (experience, seniority within the rm, schooling, etc.)
and dierences in the returns to those attributes. The latter is interpreted as
the unexplained part of the gap or "discrimination" component.
Our approach progresses from this tradition along two routes. On one hand,
from a methodological point of view, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition can
be seen as a particular way to establish the Gelbach decomposition, with the
additional benet of providing a framework for statistical inference (for more
details, see Gelbach (2016) section 5.2.). On the other hand, the set of variables
considered in our analysis provides a richer insight on the current sources of
the gender pay gap. Indeed, the set of variables considered in the traditional
approach has proven informative at times (and in countries) where there was
indeed a gap in the attributes of males and females. However, even then this
approach provided weak clues regarding the mechanisms that could lead to
dierent returns on male and female attributes. Today, in countries where there
is a notable convergence in labour market attributes across genders, the method
is no longer as revealing { if males and females had exactly the same attributes,
all of the burden of the wage gap would fall on the "unexplained" component
or dierences in returns.
Symptomatic of this evolution in the labour market is the contrast in the
focus of the chapters on gender in the Handbooks of Labor Economics a decade
apart. The chapter by Altonji and Blank (1999) reported on the crucial im-
portance attached in empirical analyses to gender dierences in human capital
endowments as determinants of the gender wage gap; while Bertrand (2011)
surveys evidence on psychological dierences and social factors, such as risk
preferences, competitiveness, and bargaining attitudes, that may lead women
and men to make contrasting occupational choices and to progress at a dierent
pace on the job ladder.
In line with this convergence of male and female observable attributes, the
meta-analyses of research on the gender wage gap in the US by Stanley and Jar-
rell (1998) and Jarrell and Stanley (2004) provide a particularly interesting core
result. Whereas the original study showed that the correction for labour mar-
ket participation selection led to a lower estimated female wage penalty, by the
mid-2000s the meta-analysis by the same authors using the same methodology
showed instead that correction for selection no longer inuenced the magnitude
of the estimated gender pay gap. The work by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008)
shows that in countries with greater female employment participation, the cor-
rection for labour market participation selection tends to have a smaller impact
on the gender pay gap than in countries where female participation is low.5
In Portugal, the convergence in male and female observable attributes is
especially transparent. Even their selection into the labour market at every
stage of the life-cycle seems to obey the same rules. This indication raises the
need to consider alternative tools of analysis that can better explore the sources
of the gender gap. In this paper, the role that the allocation of workers to
rms and to jobs |a very ne partition of occupations for purposes of wage
bargaining |are thoroughly scrutinised. We therefore highlight the decisions
on labour market allocation that may inuence the gender pay gap.
7 Conclusion
By combining the estimation of wage regressions with sets of high dimensional
xed eects and Gelbach's (2016) decomposition method, we provide an unam-
biguous answer to the questions: How much does the allocation of workers into
rms and jobs matter for the gender pay gap? What is left of the gap once we
account for those allocation mechanisms? Roughly one fth of the conditional
gender wage gap that subsists for workers with the same general labour mar-
ket experience and the same seniority within the rm is due to their allocation
to rms of dierent quality; a similar share is due to their allocation to jobs
of dierent quality. To the extent that males and females with the same age
and tenure, doing the same narrowly dened job for the same rm would be
expected to present similar ability, we would allocate the remaining three fths
of the gender wage gap to \discrimination".
We also show that the widely documented glass ceiling eect operates mostly
through worker allocation to rms, with lower access of females to higher paying
5In their analysis based on survey data, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) report that Portugal
shows an intermediate gender employment gap, below the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian
countries, close to Central Europe, and considerably above the Southern European countries
of Greece, Spain, and Italy (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008, p. 623, Figure 1).
rms, rather than through worker allocation to jobs.
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics on Population under Study
Males Females
Mean Log Real Hourly Wage 0.323 0.081
(standard dev) (.564) (.499)
Age 38.1 35.4
(standard dev) (11.3) (10.4)
Tenure (months) 107.5 94.6
(standard dev) (107.8) (96.2)
Mean Schooling (years) 7.1 7.8
(standard dev) (3.9) (4.0)
Share 4 years schooling 38.4 31.2
Share 6 years schooling 21.4 21.6
Share 9 years schooling 16.5 16.8
Share high school 14.9 20.0
Share university 6.4 8.4
Number of observations 17,332,330 10,880,440
Table A2: Regressions (Log) Real Hourly Wages
(1) (2)
female -.230
(.005)
age .053 .020
(.001) (.00006)
age sq. -.0006 -.0002
(.00002) (7.88e-07)
tenure .002 .0006
(.0001) (4.41e-06)
tenure sq. -1.32e-06 -1.23e-06
(1.61e-07) (1.11e-08)
year xed eects yes yes
rm, job, and worker xed eects yes
Obs. 28,212,770 28,212,770
R2 .189 .915
Standard-errors clustered at the rm level.
Table A3: Descriptive Statistics on the Fixed Eects
Percentile
10 median 90
Firm xed eect
males -0.698 -0.421 0.031
females -0.700 -0.470 -0.083
gap x 100 -0.3 -4.9 -11.4
Job xed eect
males -0.169 -0.047 0.257
females -0.188 -0.086 0.233
gap x 100 -1.9 -3.9 -2.4
Firm and job xed eects estimated according to equation (1).
Tables and Graphs
Table 1: Conditional Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap
Worker FE Firm FE Job FE
0.1444 0.0431 0.0425
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00004)
Decompositions based on Gelbach (2014). The basic model includes as regressors a quadratic term
on age, a quadratic term on tenure, and year dummies, apart from the gender dummy variable.
The full model further includes the sets of xed eects specied. The number of xed eects are:
576,459 for the rm; 107,785 for the job; and 4,138,799 for the worker.
Figure 1: Activity Rate, 2010
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Figure 2: Hours of Work, 2009
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Figure 3: Years of Schooling, 2009
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Figure 4: Kernel Density of Raw Wages, by Gender
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The plot excludes wages below percentile 1 of the female distribution and above percentile 99 of the
male distribution. Both kernels rely on a common bandwidth.
Figure 5: Kernel Densities of Fixed Eects (Job, Firm, Worker), by Gender
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All plots exclude wages below percentile 1 of the female distribution and above percentile 99 of
the male distribution. Each graph uses a common bandwidth.
Figure 6: Conditional Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap, Separately by
Year
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See note to Table 1.
